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Abstract 
 
 
At some point in the history of most nations, one or more events of illegal electronic 
surveillance by those in power or law enforcement has occurred that has the effect of setting 
State against Citizen. The media sensationalise these incidents for profit, however they more 
often correctly express the concern felt by the general public. At these times politicians rise, 
either into fame or infamy, by proposing new legislation which the public is told will protect 
them by from future incidents of illegal and unwarranted invasion by officers of the state. Two 
things have occurred since these protective laws were enacted; technological advancement that 
is claimed has frustrated legitimate investigation, and changes in the law that are ostensibly 
presented as intending to facilitate the prosecution or prevention of a publicly decried offence, 
like child pornography, but which in context deliver expanded powers to the State, effectively 
weakening the protections previously enacted.  
 
 
This report looks at human rights legislation in three jurisdictions, starting from a position of 
comparing and contrasting the protections that are available from illegal search and seizure. 
By identifying legislative changes related to several forms of electronic surveillance and 
technology, and the situations that led to them, we can locate the effective peak of protection 
and discuss the processes that have led to a gradual yet pervasive weakening of those laws in 
all three nations.  
 
We are regularly diverted by those in power towards disregarding the paranoia of the outliers 
who have been warning us with their purple prose that big brother is watching. But if we focus 
on the effect of recent legislative changes in the area of electronic surveillance we can clearly 
see that the Orwellian dystopia is already here, and we are living it. 
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Introduction 
 
The human rights and constitutional laws of many western countries use wording intended to 
extend an expectation of privacy in our day-to-day lives. This is especially true when we 
legitimately believe ourselves to be in a private location, such as behind the closed doors of the 
family home. The expectation of privacy is constantly under fire from a gradual yet pervasive 
change in surveillance law; laws that have weakened domestic protections and exposed the 
private lives of citizens, allowing dissemination of information to a wider range of government 
and non-government organisations. Every change chips away at the individuals’ rights, 
reducing some to the point that they are mere words on paper, no longer supporting the citizens 
they were enacted to protect. 
 
News articles discussing applications on smart devices that have ‘crossed the boundary’ are a 
frequent occurrence. Applications that access and distribute private information stored within 
the device1, or worse, accessing the microphone and camera to spy on what we are doing2,3,4. 
                                                 
1
 T Halleck “How to turn off smartphone apps that track you in the background” (2014) 
<http://goo.gl/zMy6iz>  
Consumer information is being collected and shared by applications on smart devices, often 
used to target advertising and commercial services. A profit model for developers of some 
freemium applications has been to integrate third-party background geolocation software code 
within their app, collecting GPS data and packaging it with browser histories, contact details or 
other user information and on-selling it to retail and media organisations. 
2
 L Freedman “Privacy Tip #7: Who is listening to your conversations through your smartphone 
microphone?” Data Privacy and Security Insider. 
3
 M Masnick “Smartphone apps quietly using phone microphones and cameras to gather data 
Wireless News <https://goo.gl/q2rd1Z> 
4
 R Schlegel K Zhang X Zhou M Intwala A Kapadia X Wang “Soundcomber: A stealthy and 
context-aware sound trojan for smartphones” (paper presented at the 18th Annual Network and 
Distributed System Security Symposium NDSS 2011). 
The authors illuminate on a growing threat from smartphone ‘sensory malware’. They 
demonstrate an embeddable software method that can intelligently, even without a network 
connection, identify and illicitly capture private information including phone, pin and credit 
card numbers, entered, dialled on or spoken to the user’s smart device. They also present a 
defensive architecture that could be implemented by device manufacturers to mitigate these 
attack vectors. 
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Almost nobody reads the terms and conditions of the device, telephone contract or software 
they use, clicking through and remaining completely unaware of the illicit ways in which we 
are tricked into exposing our personal lives5,6. In these instances, we freely and unknowingly 
give up the right to our own information. 
 
Written almost seventy years ago, George Orwell’s 1984 paints the bleak picture of a dystopian 
state continuously watching and collecting information on its citizens via two-way telescreens7. 
In contrast to today where smart devices are ubiquitous, not all of Orwell’s citizens possessed 
the expensive telescreens. Today we willingly, and blindly, allow the telecommunications 
companies, search engine providers, advertising agencies and even the State to have access to 
the vast array of personal information contained or generated within these devices.   
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
5
 S Gindin “Nobody reads your privacy policy or online contract? Lessons learned and 
questions raised by the FTC’s action against Sears (2009) 8 NWJTIP 1. 
6
 A Phillips “Think before you click: Ordering a genetic test online” (2015) 11 STL 2. 
Clicking ‘agree’ to an online contract is deemed as legal consent without any proof that the user 
read or understood the terms. Counselling the signatory regards the responsibilities and 
ramifications of agreeing to contract terms should be preferred. Online contracts should be 
formatted and couched so that the general public can better read and understand, ensuring true 
‘informed consent’. Online contracts should be flexible, advise who information may be shared 
with and allow the signatory to opt out or alter the contract terms in a structured manner. 
7
 G Orwell 1984 (Signet Classics, London). 
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Background and Concepts 
 
While many miss the personal significance, we have all seen numerous stories in the media 
discussing electronic surveillance. From the stories that came out of the Kim Dotcom case and 
later discussion of the role of the GCSB in New Zealand, sensational headlines about the 
American NSA’s programs that followed whistle-blower Edward Snowden’s publication on 
the WikiLeaks website, and the more shocking revelations that your local council8 and hospital9 
are conducting electronic surveillance on a daily basis, over the last couple of years as 
technology has advanced, the topic has become notorious. 
 
Commercial Electronic Surveillance 
Commercial surveillance is mostly tolerated; considered by many as another cost of 
convenience10, or participation in our consumer-driven society11,12,13. Few worry about the 
                                                 
8
 Kuringai Council Overt electronic surveillance in public places 
<http://www.kmc.nsw.gov.au/Current_projects_priorities/Initiatives_and_campaigns/Overt_e
lectronic_surveillance_in_public_places> 
9
 S Kennedy Electronic Surveillance in Hospitals: A review (paper presented at the 4th 
Australian Information Security Management Conference, Perth, Western Australia, 2006)  
10
 United States v. Jones 132 S. Ct. 945, 565 U.S. 
Justice Alito at page 10 of her judgement suggests that some people may find the trade-off of 
privacy for convenience worthwhile, or come to accept this diminution of privacy as 
inevitable. 
11
 S Grimes L Shade “Neopian economics of play: Children’s cyber pets and online 
communities as immersive advertising in neopets.com” (2005) 1 IJMP 2. 
The popular NeoPets model known as ‘immersive advertising’ engages young children through 
a free website that emotionally invests them to return regularly to care for and entertain their 
virtual pet; playing games and interacting with the pet and other users in order to earn points. 
There is a consumerism element to the website where the children are encouraged to spend the 
points earned on virtual food, clothing, accommodation and toys for their pet – while also being 
constantly bombarded by real-world fast food and toy advertising that is embedded into every 
element of the virtual landscape rendered in the game-space.  
12
 D Hoffman T Novak M Peralta “Building consumer trust online” (1999) 42 ACM 4. 
13
 V Senicar B Jerman-Blazic T Klobucar “Privacy-enhancing technologies: Approaches and 
development” (2003) 25 CSI 2. 
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State accessing this information or what it might be used for14. Even fewer appreciate how 
surveillance law has changed since 2011; changes allowing governments and law enforcement 
agencies greater access to what is an ever-growing body of commercially captured personal 
information15.  
 
Metadata 
The most common and easily accessible form of personal information being collected is classed 
as metadata. Metadata in this context is defined as information about a communication, the 
Who, when, where and how, but not the what, that is; not the conversation that took place during 
the phone call or the subject line and content of an email message16. Metadata is being used by 
law enforcement and others to draw inferences about our state of mind, our intentions, personal 
associations and interactions. These inferences can be used to justify stored communications 
warrants allowing access to the full record stored in ISP and telecommunications providers’ 
servers. 
                                                 
14
 L BeVier “Information about individuals in the hands of government: Some reflections on 
mechanisms for privacy protection (1995) 4 WMBORJ 2. 
15
 A Cockfield “Who watches the watchers? A law and technology perspective on government 
and private sector surveillance” 29:1 QLJ 364 at 7. 
16
 Attorney General “Data retention” (2015) <https://www.ag.gov.au/dataretention>  
This website presents a natural language adaptation of the contents of the Telecommunications 
(Interception and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Act 2015, s 187AA(1) for the general 
public. 
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While police have been known to mislead judges to secure warrants,17,18,19,20 they very rarely 
acknowledge such duplicitous behaviour. Even when caught out21. The ability to misinterpret 
and draw incredible conclusions from the incomplete picture posed by metadata simply 
provides a new avenue for suitably motivated, well intentioned or even misguided police to 
achieve warrants they might otherwise be unable to procure in any lawful way. 
 
Warrants, Scope and New Technologies 
A warrant is presumed necessary before the State may engage in domestic surveillance. 
Historically warrants had to identify the target individual and mode of communication (specific 
phone number or internet connection), and therefore there was some certainty that only 
information pertaining to the target was to be returned. Some recent legislative changes, at least 
                                                 
17
 P Shenon Secret court says FBI aides misled judges in 75 cases (2002) 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2002/08/23/us/secret-court-says-fbi-aides-misled-judges-in-75-
cases.html> 
18
 A Broyles Police detective on paid leave after judge alleges he lied to get a search warrant 
(2016) <http://kfor.com/2016/02/29/police-detective-on-paid-leave-after-judge-alleges-he-
lied-to-get-a-search-warrant/> 
19
 J Hopkins Attorney: Police misled magistrate to get search warrant (2008) 
<http://pilotonline.com/news/attorney-police-misled-magistrate-to-get-search-
warrant/article_b04fb986-2f3d-5212-8e43-9f7029c3f0e2.html> 
20
 C Knaus Illegal police search causes armed robbery trial to collapse (2016) 
<http://www.canberratimes.com.au/act-news/illegal-police-search-causes-armed-robbery-
trial-to-collapse-20160318-gnm078.html > 
21
 R v Orry Kuzma [2016] SCC 150/15 
Two police officers performed an illegal search of an enclosed carport under the pretence of 
‘seeing if the defendant was home’. During this the female officer observed a television 
allegedly stolen from a complainant living in an adjacent property. The police officers retreated, 
and attempted to cover up their illegal search by calling a third officer uninvolved with the case, 
giving him a false story and asking him to call a magistrate to secure an urgent search warrant. 
When presented with contradictions in her story of events and other evidence recorded during 
the District and High court trials of the defendant, Justice Walmsley records that the female 
police officer maintained the ‘ducking and weaving’ and constructively evasive denials she had 
given in the lower courts. Only when admonished sternly by the Court and repeatedly questioned 
by defence counsel did she finally admit that she had in fact performed the illegal search, had 
lied to the third police officer and caused him to mislead a Magistrate into authorising the search 
warrant used to re-enter the premises.  
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in one jurisdiction, have laid the groundwork for a more scattergun approach, delivering to 
police the device and subscriber details without the need for a warrant,22 and recordings of all 
calls that occurred over a given timeframe or in a given cell site when they have been able to 
secure one. 
 
Law enforcement justify warrantless use of novel electronic surveillance technology by 
asserting the tech is not considered by existing law, and when privacy concerns are expressed, 
the fall-back position that the technology has not yet been explicitly ruled out by the courts23. 
Such was the case initially with GPS tracking devices affixed to suspect’s cars. It was believed 
that because the GPS trackers did not record conversations they fell outside of existing 
surveillance law24.  
 
This paper begins by providing an overview of the rights afforded to citizens in three 
jurisdictions; the United States, Australia and New Zealand. This is followed by an overview 
of the historic legal framework that has come into place to govern electronic surveillance; such 
situations as police listening to or recording the telephone calls of private citizens. We will 
look at some of the changes governments have made and are making, whether in shoring up 
citizens’ rights or more often, in simplifying the means by which law enforcement or others 
can access the ever-growing body of information recorded about individuals. These changes 
will be constructively illuminated from the perspective of the current technologies that pervade 
                                                 
22
 B Grubb E Partridge Police scoop up data on thousands in mobile phone ‘tower dumps’ to 
track down criminals (2014) <http://www.smh.com.au/digital-life/mobiles/police-scoop-up-
data-on-thousands-in-mobile-phone-tower-dumps-to-track-down-criminals-20140704-
zsvtf.html> 
23
 A Koppel “Warranting a warrant: Fourth amendment concerns raised by Law Enforcement’s 
warrantless use of GPS and cellular phone tracking” 64 UMLR 3 at 1076. 
24
 Id. at 1065 
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our everyday lives, our altered use patterns, and the potential harm that could come from 
exposure of our personal information. 
 
Some of the topics that will be discussed include: GPS and newer forms of tracking technology; 
the systems coming online to give free access to all citizens’ internet metadata; law 
enforcement’s use of hacking as an investigation tool, and; how governments are monitoring 
and firewalling what we see on the internet. 
 
In each of the jurisdictions researched for this report there has been a clear and divisive move 
towards making more information available to law enforcement agencies with significantly 
lower thresholds for cause. Certainly, some of the revelations seen in the recent Snowden and 
WikiLeaks reports would have George Orwell saying; “I saw that coming!” 
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Constitutions and Human Rights 
 
Protection against the unwarranted Search and Seizure 
 
 
This section describes the legislative foundations established in the jurisdictions of the United 
States, Australia and New Zealand to protect their citizens from illegal search and seizure.  
 
United States  
The Fourth Amendment to the US Constitution delivers the right of citizens to be secure from 
unreasonable search and seizure which, by the amendment’s definition, are those conducted 
without a warrant that specifically identifies the place being searched and the person or item 
sought. While early cases like Olmstead25 focused on fourth amendment rights as protecting 
property, declining to extend it to the wiretapping of a telephone line, the Supreme Court in 
Katz26 rejected this property-only approach, extending understanding of the Fourth 
Amendment and ruling that “…what a man seeks to preserve as private, even in an area 
accessible to the public, is constitutionally protected”27. Congress affirmed this position by 
passing a number of laws in the decade following, in part as a result of the Katz decision but 
equally in reaction to the wiretapping scandals of the Nixon administration.  
 
Understanding of the Fourth Amendment’s position on surveillance was further enhanced by 
the ruling in Kyllo28, where the Supreme Court ruled that the warrantless use of electronic 
                                                 
25
 Olmstead v. United States [1928] 277 US 438. 
26
 Katz v United States [1967] 389 US 347. 
27
 Id. at 350. 
28
 Kyllo v United States [2001] 533 US 27. 
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surveillance technology, in this case a thermal imaging device that accidentally saw heat from 
lamps used in a garage to grow marijuana, was unconstitutional and violated the reasonable 
expectation of privacy in ways that would have previously required a warrant and physical 
search29.  
 
 
Australia 
Australia is signatory to the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR)30, 
yet freedom from unreasonable search and seizure has not been conferred upon its citizens in 
any direct or meaningful way. The Privacy Act 198831 provides the legislative framework for 
how personal information is to be collected, stored, accessed and shared, however the purpose 
of this Act is not intended to provide protections similar to the US Fourth Amendment or NZ 
Bill of Rights Act. An array of statutory provisions and specific powers applies to particular 
criminal activities, each a defeat to common law of trespass that would otherwise render 
searches unlawful,32 such as when NSW Police conducted a raid on hundreds of Greek 
expatriates in Sydney, searching their homes and arresting family members; they didn’t think 
the effort of getting search warrants was necessary as it was assumed the targets were all non-
English speaking migrants who would either be ignorant of or too afraid to invoke their legal 
rights.33 The focus of these legislated provisions is to facilitate police investigation34. 
Australian courts approach from a position of strict adherence to the letter of the law, deeming 
                                                 
29
 Id. at 40 
30
 International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, Art 17. 
31
 Privacy Act 1988 at Schedule 1, Australian Privacy Principles (APPs). 
32
 P Marcus V Waye “Australia and the United States: Two common criminal justice systems 
uncommonly at odds” (2004) 224 WMLSSR at 38. 
33
 P Grabosky Wayward Governance: Illegality and its control in the public sector (Aust. 
Institute of Criminology, Canberra, 1989) 
34
 P Marcus (29) at 38. 
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conduct by officers that falls outside the prescribed provisions as unlawful, and any evidence 
gained, excluded35. In some instances, warrantless searches may be undertaken. For example, 
in some Australian states police have a general power allowing them to search person and 
vehicle where they reasonably suspect evidence of a criminal offence36, 37. 
 
 
New Zealand 
Like Australia, New Zealand is a signatory to the CCPR38 who has also not directly 
incorporated it into legislation. However, New Zealand has developed human rights legislation 
that echoes many CCPR themes. The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act (BoRA) Section 2139 
provides functionally similar protections to the US Fourth Amendment and is primarily 
concerned with the privacy interests of individuals against intrusion by the State. Chief Justice 
Elias referred to this as “the right to be let alone”40. This right is further enhanced by the Search 
and Surveillance Act (SSA)41 2012, which describes its purpose as “recognis[ing] the 
importance of the rights and entitlements affirmed in other enactments including New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act 1990.” 42 
 
  
                                                 
35
 Bunnings v Cross [1978] 141 CLR 54 at 64. 
36
 Police, Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000, ss 27-30. 
37
 Summary Offences Act 1953 (Sth Aust), s 68. 
38
 International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, Chapter IV: Human Rights, 
Signatories.  
39
 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 21. 
40
 Hamed v R [2011] NZSC 101, [2012] 2 NZLR 305, (2011) 25 CRNZ 326 at [10]. 
41
 Search and Surveillance Act 2012. 
42
 SSA, s 5. 
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Legal Frameworks and Recent Changes 
 
 
 
 
General Issues and Discourse 
 
 
United States  
Passing of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)43 in 1978 enabled the creation of 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Courts (FISA Courts). Most used by the NSA and FBI, FISA 
Courts were originally established to oversee issuing of surveillance warrants against foreign 
spies’ resident on US soil44.   
 
The government back-peddle on American surveillance law has been traced to the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act45 (ECPA) of 198646. While extending the citizen’s ability to sue 
law enforcement for unlawful breaches to privacy after the fact47, this law has been interpreted 
by judges as facilitating warrants for law enforcement to secretly enter private homes and 
install listening devices, or ‘bugs’48. Incorporated into the ECPA is the Stored Communications 
                                                 
43
 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 1783. 
44
 D Cohen J Wells American national security and civil liberties in an era of terrorism (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan). 
45
 Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 100 Stat. 1848. 
46
 Get Legal “Electronic Surveillance” (2014) <http://public.getlegal.com/legal-info-
center/electronic-surveillance/>  
47
 Id. at para 6. 
48
 Id. at para 5. 
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Act (SCA)49. The SCA treats email differently depending on a number of factors. While 
metadata elements such as the parties involved and time when the email was sent do not require 
a warrant, the subject line and content in most circumstances do. Table 1 illustrates how email 
contents are treated by the SCA. 
 
Text within 18 U.S.C. section 270350 allows for an administrative subpoena, known as a 
National Security Letter (NSL), to be served on a records holder. The administrative subpoena 
requires the records holder to disclose subscriber information including; name, address, 
telephone and internet connection details, dates and times of access and the details of the 
service used, IP addresses and the payment methods used by the subscriber51. 
 
Table 1: US Law Enforcement access to email content52 
Email State Requirement for Access Statute 
Email in transit Warrant 18 U.S.C. § 2516 
Email stored on home computer Warrant 4th Amendment 
Email in remote storage, already opened Subpoena 18 U.S.C. § 2703 
Email in remote storage, unopened and stored 
for less than 180 days 
Warrant 18 U.S.C. § 2703 
Email in remote storage, unopened and stored 
for more than 180 days 
Subpoena 18 U.S.C. § 2703 
 
The ECPA enables disclosure of information to third parties, especially when that third party 
                                                 
49
 Stored Communications Act, 100 Stat 1848, 1860. 
50
 USA PATRIOT Act, s 2703. 
51
 EPIC “Electronic Communications Privacy Act” (2015) <http://epic.org/privacy/ecpa/> at 
[18] 
52
 Adapted from: EPIC “Electronic Communications Privacy Act” (2015) 
<http://epic.org/privacy/ecpa/> 
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is an agency of the Government53. U.S.C. section 270254 describes disclosure as always 
justified where it is reasonably believed that an emergency is imminent involving immediate 
danger of death or serious physical injury to any person. This amendment came as part of the 
USA PATRIOT Act has allowed law enforcement to forgo even the minimum burden of a 
subpoena or court order when claiming an undefined emergency necessitates access to the 
records55. Although the law makes it voluntary for the service provider to respond, in practice 
many do56.  
 
The 180-day provision in the 1986 text of section 2703 noted in Table 157 is still in force today 
and draws much criticism. Webmail services such as those of Google and Hotmail did not exist 
when the original law was drafted and the US Congress describe their approach as one that saw 
email left on a server beyond 180 days as abandoned property, less worthy of protection than 
those stored for a shorter period58,59. This distinction is no longer relevant 60, as email users 
now have access to unlimited storage and tend to retain more.  The provision is also in conflict 
with other legislation including the Sarbanes-Oxley Act61 (SOX), which imposes retention 
rules on business email that would see it stored in corporate and cloud servers for five years62, 
well beyond the ECPA’s 180 days.  
                                                 
53
 Id. at [20] 
54
 ECPA, s 2702. 
55
 EPIC (52) at [20] 
56
 EPIC (52) at [20] 
57
 ECPA, s 2703. 
58
 R Calo “Against notice scepticism in privacy (and elsewhere)” (2011) 1027 NDLR at pp 27. 
59
 C Doyle “The USA PATRIOT Act: A legal analysis” (2002) CRS Report for Congress, 
Congressional Research Service. 
60
 Calo (58) at pp 27. 
61
 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 116 Stat. 745. 
62
 Id. at s 802(a)(1) and 802(a)(2). 
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On the 27th of April this year Congress approved63 the Email Privacy Act of 2016 (EPA), a Bill 
proposed to amend a number of sections of the SCA. Intended to extend the ruling of the U.S. 
Court of Appeals in the Sixth Circuit in Warshak64 federally, the EPA strikes out many of the 
post-180 day storage provisions in the existing SCA65, replacing them with a blanket 
requirement for warrant meeting federal probable cause requirements66. 
 
The Protect America Act67 (PAA), signed by President Bush in 2007, significantly altered 
FISA. The first change removed the requirement for warrants 68,69. The more significant 
change, however, was one of context. The original FISA text required that the party being 
monitored must be a foreign target and the communications being collected were passing to or 
from the foreign target and were intercepted with a FISA warrant. The PAA requires neither 
party to be identified as a foreign target, meaning both parties in an intercepted communication 
may be domestic citizens70. The new requirement sought only that the communication “be 
about” or “with reference to” a foreign target71. As Cardy describes72;  
If Sally in Toledo were talking to George in Austin about their cousin, Jean, who 
was on vacation in Germany, the Protect America Act permits intelligence 
agencies to “collect” this conversation without a warrant. The only thing that the 
government needs to know before proceeding with the collection is that the 
                                                 
63
 US Congress H.R.699 – Email Privacy Act (2016) <https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-
congress/house-bill/699/text> 
64
 United States v. Warshak 631 F.3d 266; 2010 WL 5071766; 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 25415 
The Court held that law enforcement reliance on the post-180 day provision of section 2703 of 
the Stored Communications Act in order to obtain warrantless access to emails violated the 
defendants Fourth Amendment rights. 
65
 Email Privacy Act of 2016, s 3(1). 
66
 Id. At s 3(1)(a). 
67
 Protect America Act of 2007, 121 Stat. 552. 
68
 E Cardy “The unconstitutionality of the Protect America Act of 2007” (2008) 18 BUPILJ 
171. 
69
 R Posner “Privacy, surveillance and the law” (2008) 75 UOCLR 245. 
70
 Cardy (64) at pp 189. 
71
 Cardy (64) at pp 189. 
72
 Cardy (64) at pp 189-190. 
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communication is about Jean, whom they reasonably believe to be outside of the 
United States. Contrary to administration and congressional statements, the 
statute does not even require the government to suspect the subject of the 
conversation (Jean, in the example) of terrorist activities or of being a threat to 
national security. 
 
 
If many believed section 215 of the Patriot Act which gave agencies like the FBI the ability to 
obtain library and bookstore receipts of private citizens was already an overreach of 
government powers73, the PAA violates the Fourth Amendment further by permitting 
warrantless domestic electronic surveillance and significantly reducing privacy protections for 
all American citizens74.  
 
Australia  
Australian police have a poor history when it comes to interception of private citizens’ 
telephone calls without a warrant. NSW police during the period from the late 1960’s through 
to the early 1980’s designed, built and implemented sophisticated devices solely for the 
purpose of intercepting and recording telephone calls.75 Over a sixteen year period, the 
Electronics Section, Technical Support Group and in its final incarnation, Technical Survey 
Unit of the NSW Police engaged solely in illegal wiretapping. The illegal acts of these police 
extended to fraud and misrepresentation, and included funding the purchase of ex-lease 
Telecom motor vehicles which were registered with the police officers personal details, names 
and addresses. The officers were supplied with uniforms and equipment designed to match the 
look and corporate feel of legitimate Telecom employees, all in the express effort to gain access 
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to Telecom street pillars, junction boxes or private residences in order to install the unwarranted 
interception devices.76 In more than one case police unlawfully captured and listened to the 
protected conversations between lawyer and client.77 It was the government’s unwillingness to 
probe too deeply under the veil of secrecy that surrounds policing in Australia that allows these 
and other unlawful acts to occur for as long as they do.78  
  
The Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 197979 (TIA) requires a warrant in 
order to intercept telephone calls 80. Requests for an intercept warrant can only be made where 
there has been an allegation of a Serious Offences81; those from a prescribed list82 of crimes 
that carry a penalty of life imprisonment or imprisonment for a period greater than seven years. 
Stored communications warrants only require that the accused face allegation of a Serious 
Contravention83 of the law which, while including a similar list of crimes84, reduces the 
limitations to offences that carry a sentence of as little as three years85, thus making it far easier 
for law enforcement to achieve the standard necessary for access to already stored 
communications.  
 
Recent amendments to the TIA via the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) 
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Amendment (Data Retention) Bill86 (2015) have considerably changed Australia’s privacy 
landscape, making more personal information available to a wider range of organisations. 
Approved organisations now have unfettered access to an individual’s metadata, which exposes 
who you communicate with and opens your associations to misinterpretation and inference. 
 
Approved organisations no longer have to meet the original restrictive definition of law 
enforcement. The new text substitutes the term criminal-law enforcement and expands the 
scope to include the Australian Navy, Customs and the Border Protection Service87. Also, a 
new broader definition for the term enforcement agencies allows for most federal and local 
government agencies88 and a range of private and non-government organisations such as those 
that operate thoroughbred horse and greyhound racing, the RSPCA, Workplace Safety groups 
and the Clean Energy regulator89. The applicant need only be administering a law rendering 
them able to impose a pecuniary penalty90 or be involved in protecting public revenue91. The 
application process remains open indefinitely92 and new organisations are regularly added.  
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TIA changes now require ISPs to retain user electronic communication data for at least two 
years. The reason for these changes becomes apparent when we consider the distinction 
between the two warrant types afforded by the TIA and the shift in how we are using 
technology to communicate. Most people have started to make fewer voice calls, favouring 
instead the use of SMS, email and social media93. These are all data-driven communications 
generating large amounts of data and metadata that traverse service provider networks and 
create records in their servers. Unwarranted access to an individual’s metadata could be used 
to facilitate the lower threshold for access to stored communications warrants; warrants that 
would be of little value if ISPs were not also storing user’s historic communications. The latest 
round of TIA changes was necessary to complete a legal structure that has taken almost a 
decade to create. It renders a situation where the privacy of all citizens can be invaded with 
ease. Where the slightest inference or pretence drawn from a lone text message or email can 
be used to justify access to otherwise protected stored communications, allowing the ‘approved 
organisation’ to abuse the privacy of the individual. Even worse, since the same law restrains 
the ISP and agency from disclosing that the individual’s records were accessed, Australian 
citizens will simply never know. 
 
Like many other countries94, Australia operates a government-mandated internet censorship 
list colloquially known in this case as the Great Australian Firewall.95 Originally proposed as 
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a system to block child pornography96 these firewalls have become a tool for governments to 
prevent citizens accessing websites containing political discourse that the current government 
finds disagreeable,97 or which it is claimed contains text of a quality considered to be ‘lese 
majeste’.98 The list maintained by the Australian Communications and Media Authority 
(ACMA) has been shown to contain many websites which were otherwise perfectly legal to 
view, including online poker and anti-abortion sites, Wikipedia entries, websites about 
euthanasia and suicide, religious sites, and even the websites of a tour operator and a 
Queensland dentist.99 To make the point that the ACMA’s list was open to abuse, a Wikileaks 
anti-censorship activist managed to even get a URL from the Wikileaks site that published the 
Danish censorship list banned, as well as another that contained political content.100 Under 
current rules, any Australian website or ISP which hosts a link allowing access to a banned site 
can be fined $11,000 per day for every day that citizens have access to the banned material. It 
is disturbing to think that in doing nothing more sinister than booking a holiday or browsing 
your dentist’s website to book an appointment, you, your ISP and the website that linked you 
can now be held in violation of telecommunications laws overseen by the ACMA. 
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New Zealand  
New Zealand law incorporates the concept of “implied license”, allowing police to physically 
enter private property and “go to the door of a private premises in order to make enquiry of an 
occupier for any reasonable purpose” 101. If the officer catches sight of anything that may be 
evidence of an offence while acting under this implied license, he may make record of it to use 
as evidence of what was seen, 102 possibly to secure a search warrant or support a later 
prosecution. 
 
The Law Commission in its report “Search and Surveillance Powers” described New Zealand’s 
search and surveillance law as outdated, identifying that much of it was written decades ago at 
a time when information mainly existed in hard copy103. They claim existing law barely 
contemplates electronically stored information, that this inherently limits police powers, 
confounds investigations and prevents convictions104. They implore the government to make it 
easier for police to utilise technology to intercept electronic communications and track private 
citizens without their knowledge.  
 
 
When police have secured a warrant, whether for person or location that the person happens to 
be in the vicinity of, NZ law allows search of the person, their clothing and anything in their 
possession105. This includes laptop computers, tablets, usb keys and smartphones106.  The 
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possessor can be compelled to provide assistance in accessing data within the device107, by 
providing passwords or encryption keys. The wording of Section 88108 that allows a warrantless 
search of anyone who has been arrested, provides sufficient flexibility for police to raise 
vaguely plausible excuses why they might search electronic devices in that person’s 
possession, for example; claiming the device contains GPS data proving the owner was in a 
location at the time an alleged crime was committed and for which they have been arrested. 
 
New Zealand is a member of the “Five Eyes” international intelligence alliance which has been 
at the centre of a long-running controversy about mass surveillance of the public109. New 
Zealand’s intelligence organisation, the Government Communications Security Bureau 
(GCSB) was caught conducting domestic electronic surveillance of Kim Dotcom at the request 
of the FBI110. Operations against domestic persons were legislatively forbidden111. After 
eventually admitting the mistake112, and despite emphatic denials that any similar mistake had 
ever been made113, a report into the operations of the GCSB later showed that unlawful 
surveillance had been conducted on a large number of New Zealand citizens114.  
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Recent changes to the Government Communications Security Bureau Act (GCSBA) 2003 have 
made some forms of electronic surveillance of New Zealand citizens legal, altering the meaning 
of section 14115 to only prevent such surveillance if it is part of foreign intelligence gathering116. 
Domestic surveillance for the purpose of cyber security117 or on behalf of the SIS, Police or 
Military118 is allowed119. No limits are placed on the amount of information being collected 
and shared with overseas intelligence partners, nor on receiving and using information from 
them about New Zealanders. Information which it is otherwise unlawful for the GCSB to 
collect on their own.120 
 
Information suggests that through the GCSB, the New Zealand government has successfully 
completed one or more phases of a project enabling wholesale covert electronic surveillance 
of all citizens121. A 2012 NSA inter-organisational capacity report shows the GCSB were 
awaiting changes to the GCSBA before bringing the project online122. These changes would 
allow the warrantless mass collection of metadata123. The 2015 GCSBA amendment appears 
to have done exactly that. It has also become public knowledge that organisations like Palantir 
Technologies, a US firm who develop specialised surveillance intelligence and data analytics 
software for the NSA and CIA, are working with the New Zealand government124 to deploy 
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their software systems. Described as a ‘Data Fusion Platforms’,125 these platforms provide a 
‘back-end infrastructure for integrating, managing, and securing data of any kind, from any 
source, at massive scale.’126 The implication in this instance has been that the Palantir system 
is being deployed to manage and integrate the wealth of data sources the NZ Government 
already maintain, with the huge influx of metadata that is either already coming, or soon will 
be, from the GCSB. 
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Geolocation Tracking 
 
 
United States  
When assessing the legality of warrantless GPS tracking, Moran127 and Gant128 both 
established that the person travelling on public roads had no reasonable expectation of privacy 
in his movements from place to place. While an application to the court was protocol for real-
time cell site tracking of mobile telephones in the US, in accord with Moran and Gant courts 
essentially rubber-stamped the application, allowing tracking without consideration of the 
legality.129 When the legislative position changed on GPS tracking devices to one requiring a 
warrant130 meeting the standard of probable cause,131 the situation for cell site tracking 
remained unchanged. Judge Ornstein was the first to question the legal basis for this practice,132 
ruling that orders allowing real-time cell site information were illegal when the standard for 
probable cause was not met133. The Ornstein Opinion also recognised in the legislation the 
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concept of a lesser standard of probable cause for access to historic cell site location data134; a 
principle that has crept into the laws of other countries135. 
 
 
Australia  
We have already discussed that Australian law now allows police, and possibly your ex-wife’s 
private investigator136, free access to the metadata generated by your cell phone and stored on 
servers at your chosen service provider. All Australian states now utilise Automated Number 
Plate Readers (ANPR) affixed to overhead bridge stanchions and gantries on highways and 
motorways, attached to red light camera equipment at high traffic intersections, and on a large 
number of mobile police vehicles. For up to ten (10) years police retain information including 
the locations where your number plate was seen, the time and the direction the vehicle was 
travelling.137 Over time, the relational database where this information is stored could be used 
to pinpoint frequent paths of travel or destinations. CrimTrac, a governmental agency providing 
services to police forces such as linking and sharing each agency’s criminal records, fingerprint 
and photo identification datasets, have proposed a national system whereby all ANPR data 
would be forwarded to their servers to be made available without warrant to police 
nationwide.138  
 
By identifying the unique MAC address of one or more Bluetooth or Wi-Fi adapters installed 
either within the car’s entertainment system or the driver or passengers’ mobile telephones, the 
BlipTrack system is able to capture journey and location times, along with route information 
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which it delivers in real-time to traffic monitoring centres139. BlipTrack utilises numerous 
directional antennas within each of the sensor units that can be affixed to a chain of light poles 
along a highway. The manufacturers claim their system returns substantially accurate 
positional and speed data140. The core interface deployed in traffic monitoring centres displays 
the distance travelled, speed and location of each vehicle from the time a MAC address is first 
sighted by the system141.  
 
Once an investigator knows your number plate and cell phone details, the ANPR data collected 
across Australia could be merged with metadata containing cell tower location histories and 
BlipTrack location histories142 to form fairly complete pictures of an Australian citizen’s daily 
routines, using it either as a way of substantiating that you were in a location at the time that a 
crime was committed, or to predict where you might be at a given time. All brought together 
without the need for a single warrant. 
 
New Zealand  
While an intercept warrant would be required in order to access real-time cell-site tracking of 
an individual, the same cannot be said of Bluetooth or Wi-Fi MAC address tracking. Both types 
of tracking can deliver real-time location information achieved through the monitoring of a 
wireless device in a person’s possession, with the only differences being that the tracking 
equipment must be in closer proximity and able to track the individual without the assistance 
of a third party, i.e. the telephone service provider. NZ Police have already admitted to the use 
of MAC addresses, even those captured, supposedly by accident, by Google. Suspect’s cell 
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phones are being harvested for MAC addresses which are matched against police records where 
that device’s MAC address has been captured near the locations of other reported offences.143 
 
Like their Australian counterparts, the New Zealand government has also begun implementing 
BlipTrack on our nation’s highways.144  
 
The NZTA, who operate the BlipTrack system on behalf of the government, claim it does not 
violate the Privacy Act or constitute warrantless tracking as they believe no personal 
information is being tracked145. They claim that the MAC addresses collected are entirely 
anonymous146. It was pointed out in 2013 that under the NZTA’s policies on the system it 
would be possible for anyone without a warrant, including the police, to access the data with 
details of a suspect’s MAC address and receive both historic and real-time location and speed 
data147. While there is no suggestion that BlipTrack data has been used to date in securing a 
conviction, police are aware of the system and have already had open access to the vehicle and 
speed information that the NZTA retain for at least three major New Zealand highways.148  
 
                                                 
143
 S Bell Google data a crime fighting tool (2010) 
<http://www.computerworld.co.nz/article/356163/google_data_crime_fighting_tool/> 
144
 R Young C Vallyon “Money well spent? The challenge of finding primary data to 
demonstrate sound infrastructure investment.” IPENZ Transport Group Conference, Dunedin 
< http://goo.gl/yRXiV1>  
Without notice or consultation with the public, BlipTrack was deployed on light poles along the 
new Waikato Expressway.  
145
 Tech Liberty “NZTA’s passive electronic monitoring system.” (2013) 
<http://techliberty.org.nz/tag/tracking/> 
146
 Id. 
147
 BlipTrack “BlipTrack Outdoor Sensor” < http://blipsystems.com/outdoor-sensor/>. 
148
 K Reid “Request made under Official Information Act 1982: BlipTrack Systems” 
<https://fyi.org.nz/request/2109/response/7151/attach/7/OIA%201626%20Alex%20Harris%2
0SIGNED.doc.pdf> 
  
28 
 
The argument against warrantless cell site tracking was established by the ACLU’s amicus 
brief in Davis149 as an issue that would potentially allow tracking of people when they had an 
expectation of privacy, for example; within the home or at the doctors surgery150. This author 
questions how tracking the WiFi or Bluetooth MAC address in real-time with BlipTrack can 
really be any different than tracking cell phones via the sim card and telecommunications 
service provider. The only change is the removal of a known third party. There are many 
hundreds of people who live along or within transmitter range of the highways where systems 
like BlipTrack are deployed. Does being able to see that they are regularly stationary and ‘near’ 
the road violate their privacy in the same way that real-time cell site tracking does?  
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Data Encryption 
 
 
United States  
In the aftermath of recent legal battles between Apple and the FBI over access to an encrypted 
iPhone comes a Bill in the US Senate proposing the Compliance with Court Orders Act of 
2016.151 If enacted, this bill is described as outlawing end-to-end encryption.152 The Bill would 
effectively make it illegal for an application or service to encrypt data without some simple 
means or mechanism available that can return it to a plain text readable format.153 While being 
very careful in the wording not to authorise the government to require any manufacturer to 
embed such a mechanism, known as a ‘back door’ into their software or operating system,154 
it is difficult to see how a manufacturer could comply with the intentions of this Bill without 
doing just that.155 A manufacturer back door would not only be open to abuse by the 
Government and law enforcement, but also to hackers and other people that encryption is 
implemented to protect us from.156 Many consider the Bill to be absurd,157 ludicrous in its 
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technical illiteracy,158 damaging to both personal security159 and the American tech 
economy.160 
 
 
Australia  
The Defence Trade Controls Act 2012 (DTCA) makes it unlawful for any person to supply, 
trade, publish or disseminate technology that is listed in the Defence and Strategic Goods List 
(DSGL)161. The DSGL contains technical specifications for encryption, measured by 
parameters such as “Key Length” and “Field Size”. The DSGL classifies any encryption over 
512 bits,162 this leaves the only encryption left unclassified being so weak that it would be 
imprudent to use.163 The DSGL doesn’t just classify the encryption method itself, but also 
covers systems, electronics and equipment used to implement, develop, produce or test it.164 It 
has been argued that the broad and imprecise language used in the DSGL effectively outlaws 
learning about and using many fairly innocuous algorithms, as well as some university training, 
publications and research in the areas of mathematics and computer science.165 
 
                                                 
158
 J Kopstein Congress’ new encryption bill, And it’s as bad as experts imagined (2016) 
<http://motherboard.vice.com/read/draft-encryption-bill-is-everything-we-feared-security-
experts-say> 
159
 D Welna The next encryption battleground: Congress (2016) 
<http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2016/04/14/474113249/the-next-encryption-
battleground-congress> 
160
 See Kopstein (70). 
161
 Defence Trade Controls Act 2012, Part 2. 
162
 The Defence and Strategic Goods List <http://www.defence.gov.au/deco/DSGL.asp> 
163
 D Mathews Even learning about encryption in Australia will soon be illegal (2015) 
<http://www.lifehacker.com.au/2015/05/even-learning-about-encryption-in-australia-will-
soon-be-illegal/> 
164
 Id. 
165
 Id. 
  
31 
 
New Zealand  
New Zealand has a history of hiding behind extremely limiting and undefined policy 
requirements in order to block the exportation of software by Orion Healthcare and Cyphercom 
that contained elements of encryption.166 The same rules about encryption being a potential 
tool or weapon that can be used by terrorists which had limited the sale of Orion Healthcare’s 
Electronic Health Record (EHR) software to US customers because it encrypted patient details, 
has also been used by MFAT to prevent the export of completely sealed and unaltered SSH 
and Python application CDs back to the Finnish and Dutch developers who produced and 
packaged it.167 Peter Gutmann of Auckland University’s Computer Science faculty considered 
that during the late 1990’s and into the 2000’s New Zealand’s situation was one that:  
 
“…enjoys the dubious distinction of having the strictest crypto export controls on earth, 
including unheard-of restrictions on books and publication of academic research. MFAT (and 
the GCSB’s) intent is to make export so difficult that any non-worthless encryption software 
(and books and academic research) will never leave New Zealand…”168 
 
A New Zealand Customs discussion paper recently released stated that Customs officers want 
unrestrictive powers to force people to divulge passwords to their smartphones and computing 
devices at the border, and without any requirement for having to show cause.169 As was the 
case with government-overseen internet filtering, the claim is that these powers are necessary 
in helping to detect and apprehend those involved with objectionable material.170 All too often 
the words ‘child pornography’ are waved at the media by politicians hoping to curry favour 
and distract us from any other potential use or misuse. Such as when they secretly downloaded 
the contacts lists and other information from the smartphone of the former wife of Michael 
Quinlan at Auckland Airport as she was returning to New Zealand from overseas and handed 
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it to police who would later prosecute Quinlan for drugs offences.171 Or when, without cause, 
they targeted law graduate Sam Blackman and confiscated his smartphone, laptop and all other 
electronic devices in his possession.172 On returning the devices, Customs claimed that it was 
not Mr Blackman’s attendance at a conference in London on Mass Surveillance held by Edward 
Snowden that prompted the action, but rather it was because of a website accessed from a 
shared internet connection in a student flat six years earlier, in 2007, that had prompted the 
action, in spite of the fact that Mr Blackman had come and gone from New Zealand on many 
occasions between 2007 and this particular instance in 2013.173  
 
While Customs were unable to compel Mr Blackman to provide passwords or assistance to 
unlock the devices at that time, it is possible to see that such a rule would be used not so much 
as an aid in child pornography cases, but rather as an adjunct to other investigative services, 
assisting police and the government to access the digital lives that many citizens would prefer 
stayed behind an electronic lock and key. When passwords are now used not just to view the 
desktop of a device, but are often tied into the device-level encryption174, rules that require one 
person to provide a password to a shared device could inadvertently be used to unencrypt the 
digital files of any other user of that device.  
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Hacking as an Investigation Tool 
 
United States  
While hacking by members of the general public remains illegal, U.S. law enforcement has an 
established history of hacking the computers of criminal suspects.175,176 The U.S. Justice 
Department recently announced their wish that federal search warrants should allow law 
enforcement officials to remotely hack the computers of individuals anywhere who are 
suspected of a variety of crimes.177 This resulted in a decision of the U.S. Supreme Court to 
amend Rule 41,178 which now allows any magistrate with authority in a district where a crime 
has occurred to authorise a warrant for remote access (hacking) and search of a computer 
storage device located ‘within or outside the district’. This grants U.S. federal law enforcement, 
the FBI, the ability to seek a warrant to hack into any computer where they can show probable 
cause, potentially even one located outside the U.S.179  
 
Australia  
Police in Australia have not denied the routine use of hacking tools to electronically break into 
and spy on suspect’s computing devices.180,181 The Law Enforcement (Powers and 
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Responsibilities) Act 2002 (LEPRA) does allow police to apply for covert search warrants182, 
which it is believed are being potentially misused as permission to remotely access and search 
computers using expensive FinFisher hacking tools without the target suspect’s knowledge.183 
Lawyers point out that the covert warrants legislation embedded into LEPRA is premises-
based184, intended to allow police to secretly enter and search premises and the computers they 
find there, and was not drafted with the notion of remotely installing hacking tools that can 
perform real-time keylogging, take screenshots and potentially transmit audio and video 
feeds.185 Victorian Police successfully petitioned for the ability to remotely access, or hack, 
suspects computers. The ability to do so came to them within the Terrorism (Community 
Protection) Amendment Bill 2015,186 which significantly expanded the powers that came with 
a covert warrant issued under the Terrorism (Community Protection) Act 2003 (TCPA).187 
When issued under this Act, the police must demonstrate a reasonable suspicion that the person 
is or has been a member of a terrorist organisation, may be involved in planning or committing 
a terrorist act, or that there has been some form of terrorist activity or the planning and 
preparation of an activity on the premises where the computer is located.188 It is not difficult to 
see, however, that Police could use this law to go after those who many may dislike, but who 
would not normally or easily fit the definition of a terrorist. One state premier has previously 
stated he will ‘run every last bikie out of the state’, and used Federal Government anti-terrorist 
laws to ban associations of proscribed organisations, ensuring the bikie gangs came under the 
umbrella definition of proscribed organisation.189 His efforts in declaring bikie gangs under an 
anti-terror law were eventually defeated in the High Court of South Australia, but if the TCPA 
had been enacted in his state during the period, the Police could have declared every gang 
member as a terrorist in order to hack their computers and install spyware and trojan software 
to collect evidence. 
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New Zealand  
New Zealand police have never acknowledged hacking the computing devices of suspects,190 
however information released by Kapersky Lab’s SecureList security news website shows that 
the New Zealand police possess seven (7) servers running the Hacking Team’s Remote Control 
System (RCS) Command and Collect (C2) hacking tool,191 almost twice that of our Australian 
counterparts.  
 
The Hacking Team RCS system runs on any Android, Apple, Windows Mobile or Blackberry 
device. It can also be remotely deployed from the RCS C2 server to the suspect’s PCs or laptop. 
The remote injection Trojan runs in the background on the suspect’s PC, infecting any mobile 
device that the suspect happens to connect to it. Once the mobile device is infected, be it smart 
phone or tablet, the device becomes remotely accessible to the law enforcement officer, who 
can issue commands from the C2 server. These commands can cause the device to take remote 
photos, open the microphone and transmit the conversations heard to the officer, capture 
information such as contacts, calendar appointments, notes and emails and capture keystrokes 
(including passwords and credit card details). The officer can access and take control of the 
WiFi, Bluetooth, GPS and cellular components, giving him the ability to see your location in 
real time, capture all transmissions coming to and from your phone, and even prevent you from 
receiving selected text messages and emails.192  
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
The United States, Australian and New Zealand governments are all working to give 
themselves and their law enforcement agencies unrestricted access into the digital lives of 
citizens. Many of these changes were promoted as simple updating of old, pre-digital era laws 
that hadn’t kept pace; an assertion that seems plausible but which is unsupported when you 
look closely at the context and outcomes, especially when many enable the unwarranted 
surveillance of people’s private digital lives without probable cause, notification or recourse.  
 
The two countries in this report with constitutional laws aimed at protecting the privacy rights 
of citizens have both made broad changes to foreign intelligence laws, laws that are meant to 
allow pre-emptive surveillance and protection from foreign terrorist threats. These changes 
have largely changed the focus of those laws in ways that give agencies unwarranted access to 
unlimited metadata and simplifying access to all domestic communications. Australia’s 
changes make vast databases of metadata held by ISPs available on informal request to an array 
of agencies, some of whom are not law enforcement, and with no reporting provisions that 
would allow the public to see when their data has been accessed. The same contradictory law 
provides Australians with a protective mechanism of complaint to the Telecommunications 
Ombudsman when information is unfairly or improperly accessed, but when it restrains 
agencies and ISPs from telling you that someone has accessed your metadata, it effectively 
renders that protection moot.  
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Victorian Privacy Commissioner Helen Versey’s comments best summated the outcomes that 
will come from these legislative changes when she said; 
 
  “The vague nature of these items may result in the ability for monitoring of any communication 
across any telecommunications device without any requirement to show necessity or cause for 
such monitoring prior to obtaining a warrant.”193 
 
 
 
 
In concluding, George Orwell’s story is beginning to look less like science fiction and more 
like reality. Each government is working towards a future where we won’t know what personal 
information is being captured… or who has accessed it.  
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Epilogue 
 
When proposed more than 8 months ago, this Directed Study thesis was going to review cyber law 
cases conducted before the New Zealand bench, looking at the evidentiary standards and 
(mis)understandings that can blossom from the not uncommon technology illiteracy of many currently 
sitting judges. Requests were made through two Barristers of good standing and three court Registrars 
for electronic copies of the transcripts and exhibits for a list of trial cases identified as having a computer 
crimes element, however, when it became apparent that starting to write this thesis was essential (to 
its timely completion, of course), only two ‘casebooks’ had been received. At the time of writing this 
epilogue, a third has been received and read, though not so much out of necessity or even morbid 
curiosity, but rather from a simple need to see if the impressions gained from reading the first two were 
borne out in the third. 
 
I am very sorry to say; they were. 
 
In New Zealand we unfortunately have a significant percentage of jurists from the previous generation. 
Those that grew up without exposure to computers in the home in their formative years. While I am 
certain many of them would now blindly assert their expertise with computers, perhaps saying that that 
they were introduced to computers at university or during their career or at large law firms that tended 
to adopt casefile systems in the late 80’s, it is fair to say that if we were able to ask them about it without 
engendering the kind of negative reaction that makes them feel confronted or threatened, they would 
be likely to admit that computers largely represent for them a black box, that they have little or no 
understanding of what actually goes on inside, how it works or how the internet and other networked 
systems are constructed or operate. Their understanding is largely limited to turning it on, logging in 
and using the standard applications like email, office apps and web browsing that everyone uses. 
 
Thirty years after Apple, and later IBM, made the personal computer something that many homes and 
schools could easily acquire, with many homes now having more than one, it is distressing to see jurists 
who believe that IP addresses are like a license or tax file number – something of a one-to-one nature, 
identifying a particular person. They do not understand that just because an action was logged or traced 
to a particular IP address, that this in no way allows us to infer that a particular person did something. 
An IP address equals a device – a modem, a router, a switch or some other piece of technical equipment 
that can be used by one or many user devices (laptops, tablets and so on), each of which can have one 
or more human users. Some being the intended human users, and in the case of hackers or your 
neighbour who accesses your Telecom Wi-Fi router that is still in its default ‘open’ and insecure state, 
some not. 
 
While it never got to be the point of this particular thesis, I would like to conclude by challenging this 
University to engage law students in at least some introductory computer science training. I do not 
speaking of training in Cyber Law or Computer Crimes, rather, I refer to actual training in the basics of 
how computers operate, how they are interconnected, how evidence should be gleaned from them and 
the new ways in which governments, police, and the general public are using them. Computers are 
going to feature heavily in their future – whether in Court, in practice, or more likely, in defending or 
prosecuting clients.  
 
Information technology has become pervasive into almost every facet of human existence. Go to a 
hospital and the nurses and doctors spend a good percentage of their day working with computers. 
Banking is done by computers. Every home has computers. Cars are becoming a self-driving collection 
of computers. Every person you see in the street has a computer in their pocket more powerful, we are 
told, than those that put man on the moon, and functionally capable of being tracked, data mined and 
used either for or against its owner. The only way to ensure that the judges of the next generation are 
not as ignorant of how technology really works as those of the current is to incorporate it into their 
training.  
 
SM 
 
Sydney 
5th May, 2016 
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